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PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are NAR, LC and Douglas E. Larsen.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2a(3)(d), Utah Code Annotated.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.
STANDARD OF REVIEW.
WHERE ISSUES WERE RAISED

ISSUES
Did the court abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion when the defendant
failed to allege any grounds for relief from the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure?
STANDARD FOR REVIEW
The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. It is within the
discretion of a trial court whether to grant relief from a default judgment and that discretion
should not be disturbed unless there is a patent abuse thereof. See Board of Education of Granite
School Dist. v. Cox. 384 P.2d 806 (1963).
WHERE ISSUES WERE RAISED
The foregoing issue was raised in the defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Relief of Judgment, dated May 24, 1995.

DETERMINATIVE. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS
The determinative statutes and rules are:

1

(a) Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b) Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
© Rule 58 A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(d) Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Defendant's
Motion for Relief of Judgment because the defendant failed
to allege any grounds under which relief could be granted.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure enumerates specific grounds for which
the court may grant relief from the judgment. In his Motion for Relief of Judgment, the
defendant sought relief under two of the enumerated reasons: first, that the judgment has been
satisfied and, second, any other reason justifying relief from the operation of law. However, the
defendant never alleged that he satisfied the judgment, only that he satisfied the underlying debt
prior to commencement of this case. Such an allegation is required to be raised as an affirmative
defense, a step the defendant failed to take. As for his second prayer for relief under the catch all
"any other reason," the only grounds which the defendant raised was an allegation that the
plaintiff failed to give him notice of the default judgment pursuant to Rule 58A. Even if the
allegation was true, failure to give notice of the default would only constitute grounds for tolling
the time restrictions on filing Rule 60(b) motions, not grounds for granting the motion itself.

ARGUMENT
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Defendant's
2

Motion for Relief of Judgment because the defendant failed
to allege any grounds under which relief could be granted.
The defendant moved to set aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. (Appellant's Exhibit "L"). In his Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Relief of Judgment ("Memorandum"), the defendant stated that his motion should be granted
pursuant to two subsections of Rule 60(b). Specifically, he moved pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6):
that the judgment has been satisfied, and Rule 60(b)(7): any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of law. However, a review of the record will reveal that the defendant never
alleged that he satisfied the judgment, and that he never put forth any reasons whatsoever why
his motion should be granted pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7).
The defendant alleged in his Memorandum that he satisfied the underlying debt by way of
accord and satisfaction prior to commencement of the case, not that he satisfied the judgment as
required by Rule 60(b)(6). Under Rule 8, accord and satisfaction is an affirmative defense which
the defendant should have pleaded in his answer. Because he did not raise the defense (or any
defense), he is barred from raising it at this late date. See Hintze v. Seaich, 437 P.2d 202 (1968).
The remainder of the Memorandum repeatedly makes the same allegation: that the
plaintiff did not give the defendant notice of the judgment. Failure to give notice pursuant to
Rule 58A does not void the judgment; judgment is entered when it is signed and filed, and not
when notice is received by the parties. See In re Bundy's Estate, 241 P.2d 462 (1952). Even if
the plaintiff had not met the statutory requirement of Rule 58 A, that fact would only go toward
extending the time limits on filing a Rule 60B motion. See Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802
P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). If the defendant's motion was made timely, he still must have

3

grounds for the Rule 60B motion over and above the fact that notice of default was not given. In
this case, the defendant failed to allege any grounds whatsoever in his original filings.
In his appeal, the defendant appears to raise a new reason why his motion should have
been granted: that the defendant was never properly served. This allegation could conceivably be
a reason for setting aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) which states the relief may be
granted, "when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon the
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said action."
However, the defendant failed to move the court under this rule and is barred from raising the
issue on appeal. Even had the defendant raised the argument h would have failed, because
personal service was made on the defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(1) despite the defendant's
attempt to evade service. (See Defendant's Exhibit "F," Affidavit of Cary Draper)
DATED this 27th day of November, 1995.

Mark T. Olson
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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